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  Hot and cool executive function and its relation to theory of mind in children 
with and without autism spectrum disorder 
 
Abstract 
Previous research has clearly demonstrated that Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 
involves deficits in multiple neuropsychological functions, such as Executive 
Function (EF) and Theory of Mind (ToM). A conceptual distinction is commonly 
made between cool and hot EF. In ASD, continued attention has been paid to the cool 
areas of executive dysfunction. Cool EF has been strongly related to ToM but 
research has not taken into account the association between hot EF and ToM in ASD. 
The present study investigates the associations between hot and cool EF and ToM in 
56 school-aged children with ASD and 69 controls on tasks tapping cool EF (i.e. 
working memory, inhibition, planning), hot EF (i.e. affective decision making, delay 
discounting), and ToM (i.e. mental state/ emotion recognition and false belief). 
Significant group differences in each EF measure support an executive dysfunction in 
both domains in ASD. Strong associations between delay discounting and ToM 
mental state/ emotion recognition are reported suggesting that hot EF makes a unique 
contribution to ToM above and beyond cool EF in typical development and ASD. 
 This study improves understanding of the profile of higher-order cognitive deficits in 
children with ASD, which may inform diagnosis and intervention. 
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Introduction 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a multifaceted neurodevelopmental disorder that 
significantly impairs children’s verbal and nonverbal communication, social 
interactions, and behaviours (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder— 
DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In addition to the core symptoms, 
deficits in Executive Function (EF) are common in ASD across the lifespan (Hill, 
2004) and have been conceptualised as an associated neuropsychological feature 
present in several ASD samples (Geurts et al., 2014b; Kenworthy et al., 2008). EF 
refers to a set of high-order, cognitive and affective control processes that account for 
future-oriented and goal-directed behaviour (Gioia et al., 2002). EF is suggested to 
control, and organise one’s cognitive activity during problem solving as well as 
contribute to learning social knowledge (Anderson, 1998). Proponents of the 
executive dysfunction theory of ASD claim that the symptoms manifested within the 
spectrum arise from early EF disruptions (Penning ton, & Ozonoff, 1996; Russell, 
1997; Russo et al., 2007), and that these are likely to have substantial indirect effects 
on Theory of Mind (ToM). ToM refers to the ability to infer mental states and is 
another core cognitive domain that is often impaired in ASD (Tager-Flusberg, 2007). 
In fact, EF has been frequently associated with the acquisition of ToM across 
childhood (Rogers et al., 2007). This article presents an empirical investigation that 
aims to expand on the executive functioning of children with ASD and to further 
explore the link between ToM and EF in children with and without ASD. 
EF was traditionally viewed through a purely cognitive lens that is elicited under 
relatively abstract, decontextualised, non-affective conditions. However, 
developmental theorists suggested that EF should be conceptualised as a broader 
construct, since it also includes affective control processes (“hot processes”) (Zelazo 
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and Müller, 2002). Building on the initial “hot-cool systems” distinction as proposed 
by Metcalfe & Mischel (1999) proposing that hot processes are emotional influences 
on behaviour controlled by cool EF processes, Zelazo and Müller (2002) suggested a 
similar, yet fundamentally different, construct of EF that distinguishes between "hot" 
and "cool" processes. These hot EF processes are different from the cool EF processes 
but coordinate with them, according to each task’s demands. Hot EF aspects involve 
top-down processes operating in emotional or motivational situations (hot tasks), 
while cool aspects of EF involve top down processes operating in affectively neutral 
contexts (cool tasks). Hot EF processes are evoked under motivationally significant, 
affective conditions such as delay discounting (i.e. the tendency to choose more 
immediate, smaller rewards) and affective decision making (i.e. mental processing 
occurring on the selection of one or more possible options under risk where one 
employs both rational and emotional processes). In contrast, cool EF includes 
processes such as inhibition, working memory, and planning, evoked under relatively 
abstract, non-affective situations (Zelazo, & Carlson, 2012). Relative to the abstract, 
decontextualised cool EF tasks, hot EF measures have meaningful rewards and losses 
for the participants. Thus, the affective salience of the situation and the associated 
cognitive processes distinguish cool and hot EF tasks. The most widely used measures 
of hot EF are Gambling Tasks, the Marshmallow Test or Delay Discounting tasks 
(Zelazo, & Carlson, 2012). Although hot and cool EF can be dissociated in lesioned 
brains, they typically work together as part of a more general adaptive function 
(Zelazo & Müller, 2002). The hot and cool EF distinction model was used in the 
present study as it has been proposed to shed more light on the roles of specific EF 
deficits in developmental disorders (Zelazo, & Carlson, 2012).  
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Cross-sectional studies on children and adolescents with ASD have consistently 
revealed significant deficits in cool EF such as working memory (Alloway et al., 
2009; Geurts et al., 2014a), inhibition (Christ et al., 2007; Happé et al., 2006) and 
planning (Kimhi et al., 2014; Verté et al., 2005) compared to typically developing 
peers (for a review see Hill, 2004). Research into hot EF among participants with 
ASD is relatively scarce and has mainly focused on older adolescents and adults.  
Studies employing the Iowa Gambling task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994) to assess 
affective decision making among adolescents and young adults with ASD have 
produced contradictory findings; with some reporting poorer performance relative to a 
control group (De Martino et al., 2008; Yechiam et al., 2010) and others indicating 
similar levels of performance between adolescents and young adults with ASD and 
typically developing peers (Johnson et al., 2006).  Very little is known about affective 
decision making in school-aged children with ASD, with one study (South et al., 
2014) suggesting that school-aged children (8-16 years) with ASD demonstrated 
significantly better performance on the IGT than controls and another (Faja et al., 
2013) reporting comparable performance of younger children with ASD (6-7 years) to 
the control group on the Children’s Gambling task (Kerr, & Zelazo, 2004). Finally, 
with regards to delay discounting ability, only two studies to date have examined 
delay discounting in children and adolescents with ASD comparing them to ADHD 
and typically developing peers (Antrop et al., 2006; Demurie et al., 2012). Both 
studies reported no differences in the performance of participants with ASD compared 
to typically developing peers in tasks assessing choices for either small, instant 
rewards or large, delayed rewards. Delay discounting deficits were only found in the 
ADHD group. The extent to which both hot and cool EF are affected in ASD is 
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difficult to determine from the existing literature, as no study to date has addressed 
the levels of both hot and cool EF in school-aged children with ASD. 
Research on typical and atypical development has consistently associated EF with the 
acquisition of ToM in early childhood. According to the emergence account, EF is a 
necessary condition for the acquisition of ToM (Moses, 2001). Less is known about 
the EF-ToM relation in school-aged children with and without ASD. Theoretically, it 
could be possible that EF and ToM are intertwined only in early childhood when both 
abilities emerge, with EF scaffolding the emergence of ToM mechanisms (Bock et al., 
2015) as shown by relevant studies (Carlson, & Moses, 2001; Sabbagh et al., 2006). A 
recent meta-analysis in typical development by Devine and Hughes (2014) has indeed 
shown a moderate association between cool EF (working memory, planning, 
inhibition, and cognitive flexibility), selective hot EF aspects (delay of gratification) 
and ToM false belief in early childhood. As this theoretical account does not explain 
potential EF-ToM relations later in development, (i.e. school age), another theoretical 
position suggests that EF and ToM are “inextricably linked” across the life span as 
both abilities interrelate through “cognitive competencies and performance factors” 
(share overlapping peripheral task demands) (Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2009). 
The study of the EF-ToM relation beyond the preschool period has recently received 
growing attention with results showing significant correlations in typical development 
(Austin et al., 2014; Bock et al., 2015; Im-Bolter et al., 2016) but has mainly focused 
on cool EF aspects.  
ToM has been consistently found to be impaired in ASD samples in measures tapping 
the attribution of false belief knowledge (Begeer et al., 2012; Sobel et al., 2005) and 
mental state/ emotion recognition (Brent et al., 2004; Holt et al., 2014). Evidence 
about the relationship between EF and ToM in ASD is limited and is more focused on 
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the preschool period as well. Pellicano (2007) indicated that ToM and cool EF (i.e. 
planning, cognitive flexibility, and inhibition) were significantly correlated in young 
children (4-7 years) with ASD even after partialling out the effects of chronological 
age, verbal, and non-verbal ability. In a subsequent longitudinal study of two time 
points (followed after 3 years), Pellicano (2010) indicated that the cool EF abilities 
(planning, cognitive flexibility, and inhibition) of children (4-7 years) of the first time 
point were a significant predictor of the changes in children’s ToM skills at the 
second time point (over and above the variance of age, verbal, and non-verbal ability) 
suggesting that EF contribute to the ToM mental understanding development in ASD. 
Only a few studies have investigated the relation between ToM and cool EF in school-
aged children with ASD. For example, Joseph and Tager-Flusberg (2004) indicated 
that ToM tasks (location change and unexpected content false belief) were 
significantly correlated to deficits in cool EF such as inhibition, planning, and 
working memory in school-aged children and adolescents (5-14 years) with ASD. 
Similarly, Ozonoff et al. (1991) found a significant relation between cool EF 
impairments (planning, cognitive flexibility, and working memory) and ToM 
(knowledge, false belief) scores in children and young people (8-20 years) with ASD. 
Despite hot EF being controlled by the ventromedial and orbitofrontal regions which 
are suggested to also regulate social behaviour (i.e. ToM) (Chan et al., 2008; 
McDonald, 2013), there is no study in ASD to date which has investigated whether 
hot EF and ToM share such a significant relation and how they may interact within 
the cognitive profile of school-aged children with ASD. Due to minimal knowledge 
regarding the hot EF-ToM relation, our study will be exploratory and specific 
predictions about such relation cannot be stated. The present study will hopefully 
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enhance our understanding of the higher-order cognitive deficits that underpin social 
cognition problems (such as ToM deficits) in ASD.  
Current Study 
The current study had two main objectives: 
The first aimed to investigate group differences in hot and cool EF in school-aged 
children with ASD relative to typically developing peers. Research on EF deficits in 
ASD has mainly focused on cool EF, failing to address hot EF measures. Thus, the 
current study sought to extend the investigation of EF differences between school-
aged children with and without ASD by employing a more extensive battery of both 
cool and hot EF tasks in comparison to previous studies (Bock et al., 2015; Geurts et 
al., 2014a). The hot and cool EF model could shed more light on the cognitive profiles 
of intact and impaired EF abilities in ASD. Moreover, as the limited research on hot 
EF in ASD has mainly focused on early adolescence and adulthood (Antrop et al., 
2006; Demurie et al., 2012; Faja et al., 2013), the present study explored group 
differences in both cool and hot EF in school-aged children addressing the age gap in 
the literature. We hypothesised that ASD participants would exhibit a poorer 
performance on tests of cool EF. We sought to determine whether participants with 
ASD, in contrast to controls, would exhibit a lower level of performance on hot EF 
measures as well. 
 
The second aim of the present study was to explore the association between hot and 
cool EF and ToM abilities in school-aged children with and without ASD. School age 
(middle childhood and early adolescence; 7-12/13 years) is a crucial period of rapid 
developmental and cognitive change where children have to define and understand 
both their own sense of self and their sense of others (Siegel, 2013). Thus despite the 
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significant evidence from early childhood, the extension of the EF-ToM relation to 
school age needs to be examined further  in order to provide a solid ground for future 
longitudinal and training studies that could more precisely identify the underlying 
mechanisms linking EF and ToM. Traditionally, research on the EF-ToM relation has 
mainly employed cool EF tasks. The distinction between cool (cognitive) and hot 
(affective) EF led Zelazo et al. (2005) to suggest that ToM may be more strongly 
related to hot EF than cool EF. Based on evidence from early childhood (Devine, & 
Hughes, 2014), we hypothesised that hot EF would still associate with ToM in school 
age and attempted to specifically examine whether ToM performance could be 
predicted by hot EF performance after controlling for potential co-variates and cool 
EF in children with and without ASD.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Fifty six children (56) with an official diagnosis of ASD (52 males) (M=9.98 years, 
SD=1.9) and sixty nine (69) controls (M=9.64 years, SD=1.58) (60 males) aged 7-12 
years old were recruited from thirty mainstream and special education schools to 
participate in the present study. All ASD participants were high functioning (IQ > 70), 
held an official clinical diagnosis by a qualified clinician using DSM-IV criteria 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and qualified for a “broad ASD” on the 
Autism Diagnostic Interview/Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI/ADI-R; Le 
Couteur et al., 1989; Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994”) and/or the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) , in accordance to 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2011) guidelines. They 
were also in receipt of a Statement of Special Educational Needs (SEN), a legal 
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document that details the child’s needs and services that the local authority has a duty 
to provide, which specified ASD as their primary need. All clinical records were 
inspected and any individual lacking detailed information about the official source of 
diagnosis was excluded from the study. No separate research diagnosis using a 
diagnostic instrument was carried out as there is high degree of agreement between 
clinical and research diagnosis (Mazefsky, & Oswald, 2006). Additional exclusion 
criteria for the ASD group included the presence of a diagnosed psychiatric illness, 
comorbid conditions (i.e. seizures or colour blindness) and Full Scale Intelligence 
Quotient (FSIQ) below 70 as determined by the abbreviated version of the Wechsler 
Intelligence scales (two subtests: vocabulary and matrix reasoning; Wechsler, 1999). 
Sixty nine typically developing children were recruited from mainstream primary 
schools (Years 2-Years 6). Typically developing participants were required to have no 
diagnosis, and no family history of ASD or other mental health disorders, dyslexia or 
learning disability. Participants were matched for chronological age (t (123) = -1.1, p 
= .29) and FSIQ (t (123) = .8, p = .42). Ethical approval for the study was obtained 
and all participants’ parents/carers gave written informed consent (consistent with the 
Declaration of Helsinki) in compliance to the University Research Ethics Committee. 
Table 1 shows descriptive characteristics (means and standard deviations) of 
participants of both groups.  
[Table 1 should be placed here] 
 
Measures 
Cool Executive Function 
Inhibition. The ‘R’ and ‘P’ version of the Go/No-Go paradigm (Mueller, & Piper, 
2014) was used in the present study to assess participants’ response inhibition. An 
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image of either the letter P or letter R appeared in the centre of the screen (for 1500 
milliseconds) on a black background. Participants were then instructed to press the 
button only when the letter P was shown (Go trials) and to avoid pressing it for the 
letter R (No-Go trials). On the second block of trials, the pattern was reversed and the 
participants were asked to press the button when the letter R appeared (Go trials) and 
to avoid pressing it when P was presented (No-Go trials) this time. There was no 
feedback provided after a correct or incorrect response. Before each block, 
participants first completed 10 practice trials followed by the actual 320 test trials. In 
order to measure participants’ response inhibition, the proportion of incorrect No-Go 
trials was recorded. Lower scores indicated better performance. 
Planning. Participants’ planning ability was measured by the Tower of London (ToL) 
task (Shallice, 1982). As a practice, participants were presented with three 3-move 
problems, followed by the 12 actual trials of the original problem set (two 2-move 
tasks; two 3-move tasks; four 4-move tasks; and four 5-move tasks). Following the 
procedure of Monks et al. (2005) and Poland et al. (2015), successful performance 
required participants to solve each problem moving only one bead each time and in 
the number of moves required; participants were given two minutes to complete each 
problem. The task was stopped when the participant completed all problems or failed 
two of them consecutively. In terms of the scoring, we measured the number of 
problems each participant completed successfully. One point was given to participants 
if they completed the problem successfully and 0 points if they failed to complete the 
problem. Scores ranged from 0 to 12. 
Working Memory. The digit span forward and backwards subtests from the Wechsler 
Intelligence Scale for Children-3rd edition were employed to measure participants’ 
verbal working memory (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991). Participants were asked to 
Page 10 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/HJCD  Email: jcogdev@emory.edu
Journal of Cognition and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
HOT & COOL EF AND TOM IN ASD  11 
 
 
 
recall the sequence presented by the researcher (at a rate of one number per second) in 
the exact same order. In the backwards digit recall task, the series of numbers should 
be repeated in reverse order. If participants responded successfully to all trials (4) 
within a block, the researcher proceeded to the next block. Each block included 2 
trials at each span length. In terms of scoring, participants were awarded 1 point for 
each correct trial and the task was terminated when the participant failed both trials at 
any given span length. The sum of the points awarded for both the forward and 
backward subtest created a working memory score which was then converted into a 
standardised score.  
 
Hot Executive Function 
 
Affective Decision Making. A modified computerised version of the IOWA gambling 
task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994) was mployed to measure participants’ affective 
decision making. Participants were presented with four decks of cards (A, B, C, and 
D) and were told they should select a card from any of the four decks each time. 
Decks A and B were equivalent in terms of overall net loss, whereas decks C and D 
were equivalent in terms of overall net winning. For each card selection, the wins and 
losses were set in a way that in every block of 20 cards from Decks A or B there was 
a potential total gain of £1,000, interrupted by potential losses up to £1,250. Losses 
were less frequent but of a larger magnitude in deck B whereas in Deck A losses were 
more frequent but in smaller amounts. For Decks C and D, the wins for each block 
were £500 totally while the potential net losses £250. In Deck D losses were less 
frequent and of higher magnitude relative to those in Deck C. Thus, Decks A and B 
were equally “disadvantageous” relative to Decks C and D that were equally 
“advantageous”. We measured whether participants    de mainly more advantageous 
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or disadvantageous decisions. Based on the approach used by Verdejo-Garcia et al. 
(2006), scores were calculated by subtracting the number of disadvantageous choices 
(decks A and B) from the number of advantageous choices (decks C and D) divided 
then by the total number  (n= 100) of trials.  
 
Delay Discounting. In line with previous research studying hot EF (Hongwanishkul et 
al., 2005; Prencipe et al., 2011), the Delay Discounting task was used in the present 
study in a computerised version to assess participants’ ability to discount rewards 
(Richards et al., 1999). This task originally included the forced-choice between 
different amounts of money after different delays or with different chances. However, 
as the task was being given to school-aged participants it was decided to modify it and 
completely remove the probability questions. Participants were told that they had to 
choose (hypothetically) between an immediate amount of money or £10 available 
after a delay. The test consisted of about 70 such questions (i.e. (a) Would you rather 
have £10 for sure in 30 days or (b) £2 for sure right now?). The amount of immediate 
money was adjusted until the participant was indifferent between the two choices 
(random adjusting procedure; Richards et al., 1999). For every participant, this 
indifference point signified the effective value of the delayed large reward relative to 
an immediate amount of money (Richards et al., 1999). Delay discounting was 
determined by five delays (0, 10, 30, 180, and 365 days later). In terms of scoring we 
followed the procedure described in Myerson et al. (2001), where the indifference 
points were used to estimate delay discounting. Thus, indifference points were 
established within participants and were plotted against time (delay). Indifference 
points and delays were normalised, by expressing indifference points as proportions 
of the amount of the maximum delayed reward (£10) and the delays as proportions of 
the maximum delay (365 days). These normalised values were used as the x (delay) 
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and y (indifference points) axes in order to plot the discounting function. Separate 
trapezoids were then created by drawing vertical lines from each data point on the x 
axis. The formula (x2-x1) ・ [(y1 + y2) ⁄ 2] was used to calculate the area of each 
trapezoid. The areas under these discounting curves (AUC) were calculated by 
summing the resulting trapezoids. Lower scores indicated better performance. 
 
Theory of Mind 
 
False/no false belief. In order to measure participants’ false and no false belief 
understanding, the Sandbox Task (Begeer et al., 2012) was used. In the first false 
belief condition, participants were told that this task was about a father and a daughter 
(Sanne) planting flower bulbs in a sandbox. Participants were asked to listen to the 
storyline carefully while they could read along from the paper if they wished. The 
researcher showed the participants the picture of a sandbox and told them the father 
decided to bury the flower bulb at the location of the cross. When the father went 
away to bring a watering can, Sanne decided to move the flower bulb and bury it in a 
different location. Before asking the false belief question, the researcher asked 
whether participants had a good look at the pictures and remembered where each 
character (Sanne and her dad) placed the flowerbulb, in order to ensure that they have 
the requisite attentional or memory capacities necessary to demonstrate their theory of 
mind knowledge (control question). The researcher then asked the participants one 
false belief question: “When Sanne’s dad comes back with the watering can where 
will he give water to the flower bulb? You have to draw a cross”. On the second no 
false belief condition participants were shown again the same picture and were told 
that Sanne’s dad decided to bury the flower bulb at the location of the cross. 
However, when dad went away this time Sanne decided to bury a stone at another 
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location in the sandbox. Before asking the no false belief question at this condition, 
the researcher asked whether participants had a good look at the pictures and 
remembered where dad placed the flowerbulb and where Sanne buried the stone, in 
order to ensure that they have the requisite attentional or memory capacities necessary 
to demonstrate their theory of mind knowledge. The researcher then asked the 
participants the following no false belief question: “When Sanne’s dad comes back 
with the watering can where will he give water to the flower bulb? You have to draw 
a cross”. In terms of scoring, the difference between the original hiding location of the 
flower bulb (0 cm) and the location where participants indicated dad would look for it 
was measured (in centimetres). If participants indicated a location towards the 
direction of Sanne’s hiding location of the flower bulb (6,3 cm) in the false belief 
version, or the stone (6,3 cm) in the no false belief version, they received a positive 
bias score. If participants indicated a location in the opposite direction of the flower 
bulb or the stone, to the right of the original hiding location, they received a negative 
bias score. Two ToM variables were created based on the false and no false belief 
conditions. Lower scores indicated better performance. It was ensured that both 
groups understood the complex instructions for the present task as the inspection of 
their verbal IQ demonstrated similar performance [t (108) = 3.08, p < .001]. Only the 
false belief task was used as a dependent variable in the subsequent analysis whilst the 
no false belief task served as an inclusion measure. More specifically, children were 
excluded from the ToM analysis if they demonstrated a deviance higher than 10cm on 
the no false belief task. Participants that were more deviant on the no false belief task 
did not likely understand the task or attend to the instructions. Introducing control 
measures in ToM tasks ensures that responses on the false belief tasks indicate 
participants’ actual representational theory of mind knowledge (Sobel, & Austerweil, 
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2016). This paradigm was employed in order to avoid ceiling effects as it is age-
appropriate for school-aged children (the classic false/no false belief task is only 
appropriate for young children 3-6 years). Furthermore, as the object is buried and 
reburied in the sandbox, a continuum is created between locations in contrast to the 
categorical approach of the classic false/no false belief task that has been found to 
sometimes omit the subtle variance in false belief reasoning at different ages 
(Bernstein et al., 2011). 
 
 
Emotion recognition 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test (children’s version; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) 
was used to assess mental state/ emotion recognition.  This task was chosen as it is a 
widely used ToM test that measures the ability to decode the feelings and thoughts of 
others from the eyes. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test has been evaluated in 
more than 250 studies and has demonstrated to have good reliability (Fernandez-
Abascal et al., 2013; Vellante et al., 2013). The test can also be considered an emotion 
recognition test (Vellante et al., 2013). It consists of photographs of the eye regions of 
28 faces. Participants were asked to make a choice between four words presented at 
the bottom of the page on which each picture appeared, choosing the one that best 
described what the person of the photograph was feeling or thinking. Successful 
performance required participants to select the correct mental and emotional state. 
Participants were asked to choose one of the terms even if they said that any term was 
quite right, thus conforming to a forced-choice procedure. One point was given to 
each correctly reported response.  
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Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS-23®. Variables were checked for 
normality and homogeneity assumptions of parametric tests.  No outliers were found. 
Three participants (1 typically developing and 2 with ASD) were excluded from the 
ToM analysis as they deviated more than 10cm on the no false belief task.  
Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA; adjusted for age and FSIQ) and 
follow up ANCOVAs (adjusted for age and FSIQ) were conducted to perform 
between-group comparisons. Post-hoc tests were corrected for multiple comparisons 
using Bonferroni correction. Pearson’s correlations were performed to examine the 
preliminary relation between EF and ToM measures within the whole sample. Finally, 
the extent to which hot EF scores would show a unique contribution to ToM 
independent of ASD and above and beyond the cool EF and control variables (FSIQ 
and age) was investigated by performing linear hierarchical regression analysis, with 
cool EF (go/no-go, digit span, ToL scores), control variables (age & FSIQ) and ASD 
diagnosis entered in Block 1, and hot EF variables (delay discounting and IGT scores) 
entered in Block 2. In addition, we examined whether the association of hot EF 
variables to ToM was stronger in either controls or ASD, by including hot EF X ASD 
diagnosis interaction terms in Block 3, computed from the cross-product of effect-
coded ASD (-1=Autistic, +1=Control) and the centred hot EF scores (Aiken and 
West, 1991). A small amount of missing data was evident for variables to be 
examined in the regression analysis (<2.5% for all variables) with missing values 
imputed using expectation maximization estimation. No violations of multivariate 
assumptions for these variables were found. All tests were two-tailed and statistical 
significance was set at p < .05. 
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Results 
Group Differences  
Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) showed that the performance of the 
ASD group on EF measures was poorer overall than that of the control group (λ = .69, 
F (5, 109) = 9.47, p < .001, η
2
= .3). Post hoc follow up ANCOVAs revealed 
significant group differences in participants’ performances both on cool EF: Go/No-
Go (F (3, 121) = 15.72, p < .001, η
2
= .12), Digit Span (F (3, 123) = 26.46, p < .001, 
η
2
= .18), ToL (F (3, 122) = 5. 73, p = .018, η
2
= .05) and hot EF tasks: IGT (F (3, 122) 
= 5.48, p = .021, η
2
= .04) and delay discounting (F (3, 121) = 11.44, p = .001, η
2
= .09) 
(see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). The ASD group performed 
significantly worse in each hot and cool EF task relative to the control group.  
ANCOVAs were also run to investigate group differences on the ToM measures. 
Significant group effects were found both in the false belief measure F (3, 121) = 
45.39, p < .001, η
2
= .28) and Eyes Test (F (3, 123) = 49.67, p < .001, η
2
= .29). ToM 
skills of participants with ASD were significantly lower than the typically developing 
peers (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). The ASD group’s performance 
was significantly lower in both ToM tasks compared to the control group. 
 [Table 2 should be placed here] 
 
Relations between EF and ToM  
Correlational analysis in the whole sample (see Table 3) showed several significant 
associations between EF and ToM measures. Specifically, ToM false belief 
performance was significantly correlated to all cool EF measures and hot Delay 
Discounting, whereas performance on the Eyes Test was related to all EF measures, 
both cool and hot. Supplementary correlational analysis partialling out the effects of 
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control variables (age and FSIQ) was conducted again. The ToM false belief measure 
remained significantly related to all cool EF and hot Delay Discounting, whereas the 
Eyes Test remained significantly associated only with Digit Span, Go/No-Go, and 
Delay Discounting (see table 3). [Table 3 should be placed here] 
 
The relation between EF and ToM was further investigated by running two 
hierarchical multiple regression analyses in order to assess the extent to which hot EF 
scores predicted ToM (false belief and Eyes Test scores) independent of ASD 
diagnosis and over and above cool EF as well as control variables (age & FSIQ), and 
to examine whether the association between hot EF and ToM was stronger in ASD 
participants compared to controls. Dependent variables included the Eyes Test and 
false belief measures.  
Full results of the hierarchical regression analysis are presented in Table 4. These 
show that the first block introducing age, FSIQ, cool EF and ASD contributed 
significantly to the variance of the ToM false b lief ability, F (6, 118) = 9.99, p < 
.001, explaining 34% of the variance. However, neither block 2 variables of Hot EF 
scores nor block 3 variables of Hot EF X ASD diagnosis interaction terms contributed 
significant additional variance. 
Regarding ToM mental state/ emotion recognition, control variables, ASD and cool 
EF explained 39.2% of the variance in Eyes Test scores [F (6, 118) = 12.70, p < .001].  
For hot EF variables entered in block 2, the total variance explained rose to 42.7%, 
representing a significant increase of 3.4% [F (2, 116) = 3.48, p =.034] additional 
variance explained. The Hot EF X ASD interaction terms entered in block 3 explained 
no significant additional variance. Eyes Test scores were significantly predicted by 
Go/no Go scores (p = .03), delay discounting (p = .015) and ASD (p < .001).  
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[Table 4 should be placed here] 
 
Discussion 
This study compared a relatively large group of school-aged children with ASD to 
typically developing peers using a number of cool and hot EF tasks. It also 
investigated the relation between both EF constructs and ToM in school-aged children 
with and without ASD. Participants with ASD demonstrated poorer performance in all 
EF and ToM domains suggesting that the reported group differences reflect a 
universal ToM and EF impairment in both hot and cool systems in ASD. Furthermore, 
our findings not only replicated the well-established relation between cool EF and 
ToM but also demonstrated a predictive relation between hot EF (delay discounting) 
and ToM mental state/ emotion recognition, prompting questions of how these 
seemingly distinct constructs are related. This is the first study to date to report that a 
hot EF aspect is a significant predictor of ToM mental state/ emotion recognition 
above and beyond cool EF in school age and that children with ASD exhibit hot EF 
impairment, which are likely to contribute to their deficits in ToM.  
School-aged children with ASD presented significant impairments in each hot and 
cool EF task relative to matched typically developing children of the same age. The 
present findings of deficits in cool EF are consistent with results of previous studies 
reporting deficits in working memory (Alloway et al., 2009; Geurts et al., 2014a), 
planning (Geurts et al., 2014a; Hill, 2004) and response inhibition (Hill, 2004; van 
Eylen et al., 2015) in participants with ASD of the same age range. There is thus clear 
evidence that individuals with ASD experience deficits in cool EF domains. 
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In terms of hot affective decision making, our results are in line with previous studies 
(De Martino et al., 2008; Yechiam et al., 2010) that have demonstrated deficits in 
adolescents and young adults with ASD and further extend this to a younger age ASD 
group. The larger sample size and different IQ level of our ASD participants could 
have possibly accounted for the results that contradicted those of Johnson et al.’s 
(2006), Faja et al.’s (2013), and South et al.’s (2014) studies, despite the IGT also 
being used. The limited sample sizes (Johnson et al., n=29; Faja et al., n=40) do not 
usually allow for the detection of significant differences while the superior IQ scores 
(10 points higher) of South et al.’s (2014) participants could possibly explain 
discrepancies in findings. These inconsistencies though highlight the need for future 
studies investigating affective decision making in school-aged children with ASD. 
Regarding the ASD deficits we found in hot delay discounting, our results are not 
consistent with those of Antrop et al. (2006) and Demurie et al. (2012) who found that 
ADHD school-aged children, but not school-aged children with ASD, chose smaller, 
immediate rewards over large delayed rewards more than the control group. Results 
contradicting Demurie et al. (2012) were quite surprising, as these researchers also 
employed the AUC scoring approach to a similar age range of ASD participants (8-16 
years). However, their delay discounting task addressed much higher reward 
magnitudes (such as 0€, 5€, 10€, 20€ and 30€) and shorter delay values (i.e. now, 
tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, 1 week, 2 weeks) than in our task. It seems that the 
discounting rate is a decreasing function of the size of the delayed reward (rate 
decrease as the amounts offered increase) (Kirby, & Maracovic, 1996). Antrop et al. 
(2006) used a less demanding task where participants had to choose between an 
immediate small reward (1 point) after a 2-second delay and a larger delayed reward 
(2 points) after a 30-second delay. Thus participants with ASD may exhibit responses 
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similar to control group discounting trajectories if the monetary rewards are 
significantly high or the time delays are very short in magnitude. Our results support 
an impairment in both hot and cool EF systems across school age in ASD expanding 
the executive dysfunction to not only cool EF but hot processes such as affective 
decision making and delay discounting as well.  
With regards to ToM deficits, the reported impairments in false belief skills are 
consistent with previous findings showing deficits in such skills in young children 
with ASD (Kimhi et al., 2014; Pellicano, 2007) and indicate that ToM difficulties 
persist in school-aged children with ASD. In relation to ToM mental state/ emotion 
recognition, our results revealed that participants with ASD presented significant 
differences relative to the control group and contradict a previous study that assessed  
ToM using mental state/ emotion recognition scores in pre-school children with ASD 
(Kimhi et al., 2014). More specifically, Kimhi et al. (2014) showed that pre-school 
children with ASD (age: 5 years) performed successfully in tasks requiring 
recognition of basic emotions (happy/sad) relative to the control group. The Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes test used here assesses a more sophisticated ability, namely to 
recognise or infer another’s emotional mental state. Such ability is fundamental to 
understanding and effectively communicating with other people when interacting 
socially. Our results indicated that this ability is impaired in school-aged children with 
ASD and are in line with previous research (Golan et al., 2007; Rieffe et al., 2000) 
suggesting that the emotion recognition of children with ASD is disrupted when 
processing high-order, complex or atypical emotions. 
 Our correlational and regression analysis results showed that EF and ToM are 
strongly associated in school age beyond their emergence in early childhood. In line 
with previous studies showing cool EF-ToM associations in young and school-aged 
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children with and without ASD (Carslon, & Moses, 2001; Pellicano, 2007; Kimhi et 
al., 2014; Ozonoff et al., 1991), we found that ToM mental state/ emotion recognition 
was predicted by cool EF (inhibition) overall. Participants who performed better in 
the inhibition task could more easily disengage from their own emotional states or 
suppress irrelevant ones, and subsequently infer advanced empathising skills for 
another’s emotion. During middle childhood (7-11/12) children are in greater need of 
their EF abilities when facing advanced forms of knowledge and widening social 
horizons through sophisticated social interactions with peers (Del Giudice, 2014). Our 
results indeed show that in ToM thinking across school age it seems necessary to 
inhibit one’s own perspective when socially interacting, in order to infer all the 
relevant interactive pieces into a coherent framework.  
Our findings confirm earlier research suggesting that hot EF does indeed relate to 
ToM performance. The hot EF aspect of delay discounting predicted ToM mental 
state/ emotion recognition over and above cool EF and control variables in school-
aged children with and without ASD. ToM is a multifaceted function involving not 
only beliefs, desires and emotions but also processes associated with the successful 
management of long-term goals (Korkmaz, 2011). Thus, the capacity to disengage 
from the present while considering more long-term goals could associate with the way 
one engages with emotional states. Stolarski et al. (2011) suggest that emotional 
functioning plays an important role in the development of a temporal perspective. For 
instance, the ability to balance decisions and their future consequences is associated 
with mental state/ emotion recognition ability in the sense that effective emotional 
functioning allows for more effective balancing between temporal perspectives. Delay 
discounting is a fundamental aspect of future temporal perspective taking and plays an 
important role in the development of future-oriented behaviours (Zimbardo, & Boyd, 
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2008). This could also explain the significant associations between individual 
differences in delay discounting and mental state/ emotion recognition. Delay 
discounting engages not only decisional processes but also affective emotional 
mechanisms, raising the need to empirically investigate how discounting rate is 
actually linked to emotional functioning across the lifespan in typical development 
and ASD.  
It should be noted that the hot EF x ASD interaction contributed no significant 
additional variance as generally interactions are notoriously underpowered for 
observational data (i.e. usually non-significant in all but very big samples); thus a 
more rigorous examination of any hot EF x ASD interaction would require a larger 
sample size. However, hot EF was associated to ToM impairment above and beyond 
any influence of cool EF, and the ASD participants demonstrated impaired hot EF. 
This could suggest that hot EF may be a key mechanism underpinning deficits in  
ToM for high-functioning children with ASD. This finding requires further replication 
with a larger sample.  
This study investigated the associations between hot and cool EF and ToM in school-
aged children with and without ASD. The significant group differences in each hot EF 
task followed by a significant association between hot delay discounting and ToM 
mental state/ emotion recognition should be considered in light of the limitations of 
this study. First, due to the convenience sampling approach followed, the children that 
participated in the current study (high-functioning group of ASD children) may not 
represent the broader ASD population. An additional limitation was also the lack of a 
validated screening tool to support the provided clinical diagnostic reports of ASD.  
Moreover, although this study provided a more advanced insight into the fractionated 
hot/cool EF model in ASD, it only included 7 to-12-year-old school-aged participants; 
Page 23 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/HJCD  Email: jcogdev@emory.edu
Journal of Cognition and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
HOT & COOL EF AND TOM IN ASD  24 
 
 
 
hence it remains to be found whether these results could be generalized to younger 
children, adolescents, and adults across the autism spectrum functioning levels. 
Finally, as the present study was the first to report such a relation, the findings need to 
be interpreted cautiously. Specifically, as hot EF delay discounting significantly 
predicted only one of the two ToM measures addressed (Eyes Test), clear conclusions 
about the role of hot EF to the wider ToM context cannot be drawn. It should be noted 
that the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test is a task tapping mostly emotion 
understanding aspects, while the Sandbox task is a more cognitive measure of 
understanding beliefs. Our results showed that hot EF presented a predictive relation 
only with the Eyes Test that can be argued to measure a more affective aspect of ToM 
cognition. The failure to demonstrate a hot EF- Sandbox task association could be 
cautiously explained in the basis of the underlying affective nature of hot EF by 
definition, suggesting that hot EF is elicited under motivationally or emotionally 
significant situations (such as inferring emotional states in the Eyes Test). It could be 
possible that cognitive and affective ToM are dissociated and that hot ToM might 
correlate more strongly with hot EF. However, as this issue goes beyond the scope of 
the present study, it is worth questioning in future research whether these two distinct 
domains of EF (hot and cool) correspond in reality to separate ToM measures tapping 
different abilities. Both ToM measures we addressed here tap only particular aspects 
of ToM (either purely cognitive or affective cognitive) and cannot be considered the 
only essential ToM measures. Follow-up research should therefore consider 
investigating such relations addressing several other varied ToM tasks such as 
second-order ToM (Perner, & Wimmer, 1985), the strange stories (Happé, 1994) or 
the Faux Pas test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). Furthermore, the exact relation between 
ToM mental state/ emotion recognition and delay discounting is difficult to determine 
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as our data do not provide evidence about directionality of the relation. In the light of 
the conceptual framework presented above, mental state/ emotion recognition seems 
to contribute to the development of temporal dimensions such as delay discounting. 
On the other hand, our regression models revealed that delay discounting predicted 
ToM mental state/ emotion recognition over and above control variables. The focus 
on specific temporal dimensions (i.e. delay discounting) may thus influence the 
development or use of emotional abilities. This unclear directionality could be further 
investigated by future studies using longitudinal approaches that could facilitate the 
understanding of such complex causal relations. Finally it should be noted that our 
correlational pattern indicated (weak) associations between hot and cool aspects in 
school age. Although this evidence is in line with previous studies in typical 
development (Hongwanishkul et al. 2005; Hooper et al., 2004; Prencipe et al., 2011), 
it raises questions about the independency of the two constructs. As generally data 
from correlational studies or factor analyses/ structure equations models of hot and 
cool EF are equivocal supporting either a single or dual factor model, it could be 
argued that there could be “some shared cognitive processes” between hot and cool 
EF components (Welsh & Peterson, 2014). It is important though at this point to also 
consider the different predictive patterns of each domain as hot and cool EF may 
predict different social/ developmental outcomes. The degree to which each domain is 
related or not to different outcomes could support somehow the notion for separate (or 
unified) cool and hot EF (Welsh & Peterson, 2014). In any case, future longitudinal 
studies across childhood and adolescence are warranted as they will hopefully better 
highlight the brain structure of cool and hot EF. 
In conclusion, the present study showed a ToM and EF impairment in both hot and 
cool systems in ASD and that hot and cool EF are associated with selective ToM 
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mechanisms in school-aged children with and without ASD. Further studies need to 
explore the organisation of cool and hot EF (from childhood to adulthood) and their 
relation to various facets of ToM. The present findings though highlight that 
considering the role of both hot and cool EF in association with ToM in individuals 
with ASD may aid in gaining a greater understanding, not only of the higher-order 
cognitive deficits underlying difficulties with social interaction for the ASD 
population, as well as the conceptualisation of these overlapping yet separate 
constructs. Our findings highlight the need to assess hot and cool EF in clinical 
practice and may hopefully aid in enhancing diagnosis or better informed intervention 
projects taking into account both hot and cool EF impairments. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Participants’ characteristics 
                                      
Group 
 
    
   Variable 
ASD  
(n=56) 
Control  
(n=69) 
Age (in years) 
M (SD)  
Range 
 
9.98 (1.9) 
7-12 
 
9.64 (1.58) 
7-12 
FSIQ total score 
M (SD) 
Range 
 
97.73 (16.16) 
70-127 
 
99.91 (14.24) 
72-135 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for EF and ToM measures. 
 Group   
 ASD 
(n = 56) 
Control 
(n = 69) 
 
Domain and Measure M (SD) M (SD) p value 
Cool EF    
                     Digit Span 7.36 (2.64) 9.91 (2.90) <.001 
                      Go/No go 50.80 (15.02) 37.93 (20.34) <.001 
                                ToL 7.07 (2.11) 7.85 (1.93) .018 
Hot EF    
                              IGT -.05 (.18) .03 (.20) .021 
        Delay Discounting .45 (.21) .35 (.12) .001 
ToM          
                    False belief                       6.4 (3.62) 3.29 (1.23) <.001 
                        EyesTest 14.87 (3.36) 18.41 (2.45) <.001 
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Table 3. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients among ToM and EF variables.  
 
 
Note. *p <. 05, **p < .01. FSIQ: Full Scale Intelligence Quotient, ToL: Tower of London, IGT: Iowa 
Gambling Task, Discounting: Delay Discounting, Eyes Test: Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
For Go/No-Go, Discounting, and False Belief tasks lower scores suggest better performance, thus the 
negative values. 
 
 
 
Measures 
F
S
IQ
 
A
g
e 
D
ig
it
S
p
an
 
T
o
L
 
G
o
/N
o
-G
o
 
IG
T
 
D
is
co
u
n
ti
n
g
 
F
al
se
B
el
ie
f 
E
y
es
T
es
t 
          
FSIQ  -.43** .22* .23** -.05 .15 -.05 -.19* .30** 
Age   -.001 .22* -.09 -.04 -.02 -.03 .01 
DigitSpan    .37** -.17 .26** -.19* -.32** .26** 
ToL     -.06 .11 -.10 -.29** .30** 
Go/No-Go      -.20* -.02 .26** -.33** 
IGT       -.09 -.17 .22* 
Discounting        .22* -.32** 
FalseBelief         -.42** 
Control for: 
Age & FSIQ 
D
ig
it
S
p
an
 
T
o
L
 
G
o
/N
o
-G
o
 
IG
T
 
D
is
c
o
u
n
ti
n
g
 
F
a
ls
eB
el
ie
f 
E
y
es
T
es
t 
DigitSpan  .32** -.15 .23 -.19 -.28** .19* 
ToL   .001 .07 -.07 -.23* .18 
Go/No-Go    -.19* .01 .24** -.33** 
IGT     -.09 -.14 .18 
Discounting      .21* -.32** 
FalseBelief       -.37** 
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Table 4.  Hierarchical regression analysis for ToM false belief and Eyes Test scores by 
group and EF variables 
Predictors False belief  EyesTest   
 β ∆R
2
 β ∆R
2
 
Block 1 
(Control variables, 
cool EF and ASD) 
 .34**  .39** 
Age -.08  .14  
FSIQ -.16  .3**  
Digit Span -.04  -.07  
Go/No-Go .05  -.16*  
ToL -.14 
 
 .09  
ASD .46**  -.47**  
Block  2  
(Hot EF) 
 .004  .03* 
IGT -.04  .07  
Delay discounting .046  -.18*  
Block 3  
(Hot EF X ASD 
interactions) 
 .03  .01 
ASD X IGT -.06  -.03  
ASD X 
Delaydiscounting 
-.03  -.12  
R
2
  .37  .44 
Page 36 of 37
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/HJCD  Email: jcogdev@emory.edu
Journal of Cognition and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
HOT & COOL EF AND TOM IN ASD  37 
 
 
 
F test  2.61  1.19 
Note. *p <. 05, **p < .01. 
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